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Global Legal Triage in Response to the
2009 H1N1 Outbreak
James G. Hodge, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION1
Considered by many public health authorities to be a mere
“glancing” blow to global health,2 the 2009 H1N1 (swine) flu
pandemic did not present the type of cataclysmic threat some
initially feared.3 Still, the spread of H1N1 flu globally
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1. This article is based in part on James G. Hodge, Jr. & Evan D.
Anderson, Principles and Practice of Legal Triage During Public Health
Emergencies, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 249 (2008) and James G. Hodge,
Jr., Legal Triage During Public Health Emergencies and Disasters, 58 ADMIN.
L. REV. 627 (2006). While these articles provide an existing foundation for
defining legal triage on a domestic level, this manuscript extends these
concepts to the global arena, specifically in response to the H1N1 influenza
pandemic. The author acknowledges the editing and research assistance of
Ron Ordell, J.D., Brian Harel, J.D., PhD, and Aubrey Joy Corcoran, J.D.,
M.P.H, as well as Christopher Stringham and Sarah O’Keefe, J.D. Candidates,
Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University.
2. Although mortality related to H1N1 largely shifted to a different
group than routine, annual flu outbreaks, deaths related to H1N1 may
actually be less severe than those during a normal flu season. See Editor’s
Summary, Anne M. Presanis et al., The Severity of Pandemic H1N1 Influenza
in the United States, from April to July 2009: A Bayesian Analysis, PLOS
MED., Dec. 2009, at 1,12 (estimating 6,000 deaths from H1N1 in the U.S.
through November 2009, which is lower than similar deaths caused by
seasonal influenza in an average year, while explaining that H1N1 victims are
younger, however, than the estimated 36,000 persons who die per year in the
U.S. from seasonal influenza).
3. See Christophe Fraser et al., Pandemic Potential of a Strain of
Influenza A (H1N1): Early Findings, 324 SCIENCE 1557, 1557 (2009)
(reporting that H1N1 flu severity is less than the Influenza Pandemic of 1918
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represents the first major communicable disease threat of the
millennium. It resulted in the first ever declaration of a public
health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) by the
World Health Organization (WHO),4 the initial widespread use
of the newly-revised international health regulations (IHRs),5
and an international response effort that featured multiple
declarations of national or regional emergencies.6 The
pandemic also offered an opportunity to assess how the global
public health system responds to transnational communicable
disease threats in the modern era.
In many ways, the global health system has triumphed.
Within weeks of its detection in Mexico, H1N1 influenza
became a global concern.7 International surveillance
coordinated by WHO, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), and others began almost immediately.8
and comparable to flu in 1957); Donald G. McNeil, Jr., U.S. Reaction to Swine
Flu: Apt and Lucky, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010, at A1 (describing the virus as
“only rarely lethal”).
4. Press Release, Margaret Chan, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Swine
Influenza,
(Apr.
25,
2009)
available
at
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_20090425/en/ind
ex.html (announcing the declaration of a PHEIC); see also David P. Fidler, The
Swine Flu Outbreak and International Law, 13 ASIL INSIGHTS Apr. 27, 2009,
http://www.asil.org/insights090427.cfm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
5. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Influenza A(H1N1) and Pandemic
Preparedness Under the Rule of International Law, 301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
2376, 2376 (2009); Rebecca Katz, Use of Revised International Health
Regulations During Influenza A (H1N1) Epidemic, 2009, 15 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1165, 1166–68 (2009); Fidler, supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., Press Release, Charles E. Johnson, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., Determination that a Public Health Emergency
Exists
(Apr.
26,
2009),
available
at
http://www.flu.gov/professional/federal/h1n1emergency042609.html;
see
generally Pub. Health L. & Pol’y Program, Ariz. St. Univ., Global Legal Triage
and the 2009 H1N1 Outbreak, http://www.law.asu.edu/?id=2036 (last visited
Jan. 30, 2010) (providing a list of state, federal, and international declarations
of emergency or public health emergency).
7. Focus: Swine Flu, Timeline: H1N1 Outbreak, ALJAZEERA.NET, June
15,
2009,
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2009/05/200952105136198276.html
(last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
8. See Katz, supra note 5, at 1166–67 (describing contact between
Mexico, Canada, the United States and WHO during the early detection of the
illness); Press Release, World Health Org., Influenza-like Illness in the United
States
and
Mexico
(Apr.
24,
2009),
available
at
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_04_24/en/index.html (stating that since
Mexican authorities began detecting the illness on March 18, “the World
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Isolates of the H1N1 virus were shared internationally.9
Sources of transmission were rapidly detected. Those at
greatest risks of morbidity or mortality from H1N1 were
National
pandemic
flu
plans
and
identified.10
interjurisdictional agreements developed by WHO member
countries over the prior decade were operationalized.11 Public
and private sector response efforts were well-coordinated in
many countries. Treatment protocols were developed and
antiviral resources like oseltamivir12 were allocated to ensure
medical care for those at risk of serious complications.13 People
with natural immunities, stemming most likely from their
exposure to the Spanish flu of 1918 or other flues, were
identified.14 A safe and effective vaccine was quickly prepared,
tested for human use, and available on the market within
months.15 And perhaps most importantly, public health
education led to temporary changes in individual behaviors to
stymie the flu’s spread and impact.16 Countless infections were

Health Organization has been in constant contact” with Mexican health
authorities).
9. Margaret Chan, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Opening Remarks at
the Intergovernmental Meeting on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Sharing
of Influenza Viruses, Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits (May 15, 2009)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2009/pandemic_influenza_preparedness_2009
0515/en/index.html).
10. See Press Release, World Health Org., Clinical Features of Severe
Cases of Pandemic Influenza: Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Briefing Note 13 (Oct.
16,
2009)
available
at
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes/h1n1_clinical_features_2009101
6/en/index.html (describing the groups most at risk from H1N1 as “pregnant
women, . . . children younger than 2 years of age, and people with chronic lung
disease, including asthma”).
11. Katz, supra note 5, at 1166.
12.
U.S.
National
Library
of
Medicine,
Medline
Plus,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a699040.html (last visited
May 5, 2010).
13. See id. at 1168. But see David Boutolleau et al., Letter to the Editor,
Detection of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Virus in Patients Treated with
Oseltamivir, 16 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 351, 351 (2010) (raising
questions about “potential virus transmission during antiviral treatment and
the possible resistance of pandemic (H1N1) to oseltamivir”).
14. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., U.S. Says Older People Appear Safer from
Virus, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2009, at A30.
15. See Denise Grady, Review Shows Safety of H1N1 Vaccine, Officials
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2009, at A13.
16. See Rick Hampson, H1N1 Flu Spreading Changes in Behavior:
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avoided and thousands of lives were saved through these and
other efforts.
In other ways, however, the global public health system
has failed despite widespread international planning,
preparedness, and response efforts. While international
surveillance commenced immediately, accurate assessments of
the prevalence of H1N1 remain sketchy.17 Global counts of
persons infected with this strain of flu are mere estimates. Atrisk individuals in many countries, including pregnant women
and children in developed countries like the United States,
were not able to access preventive measures, including
vaccines, when they needed them most.18 Persons at risk in
developing countries had essentially no chance to be
vaccinated.19’20 Antiquated techniques slowed vaccine
manufacturing, leading to an immediate global allocation
crisis.21 Even when vaccines became available, their
distribution was marred by international battles over who
would receive supplies first, infighting over its allocation within
countries, and gross failures to distribute to those most at
risk.22 In essence, emergency response efforts could not stop the
natural spread of flu, nor could public health interventions
protect those most at risk in many countries. Had H1N1
resembled a more potent strain capable of killing victims with
Prevention-minded Adopt New Policies, USA TODAY, Oct. 30, 2009, at A1.
17. See Press Release, World Health Org., Pandemic (H1N1) 2009–Update
83
(Jan.
15,
2010),
available
at
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2010_01_15/en/index.html.
18. See Andrew Pollack & Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Road to Flu Vaccine
Shortfall, Paved with Undue Optimism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2009, at A1
(describing the shortfalls in the United States government’s original estimates
for vaccine supply availability).
19. See, e.g., Gboyega Akinsanmi & Steve Dada, Nigeria: Swine Flu–
Jan.
20,
2010,
’Vaccine
Not
Available’,
ALLAFRICA,
http://allafrica.com/stories/201001200317.html (noting that as of January 20,
2010, government authorities in Lagos, Nigeria, had “no vaccine to treat the
flu virus in stock” despite the recent death of a thirty-eight-year-old woman
and the positive tests of eight other people in the area).
20. See Martin Enserink, Developing Countries to Get Some H1N1
Vaccine–But When?, 326 SCIENCE 782, 782 (2009).
21. See Pollack & McNeil, Jr., supra note 18, at A13.
22. See Enserink, supra note 20; Tan Ee Lyn, Asia Worries over H1N1 Flu
May
18,
2009,
Vaccine
Production,
REUTERS,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUST208264 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010)
(reporting that Indonesia and India were worried about their access to vaccine
produced predominantly in Europe and the United States).
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the ease of H5N1 (avian) flu, the global health impact would
have been considerably worse.23
If H1N1 was a “test” run of the modern global public health
system,24 then the system has fallen short. Significant response
efforts globally could not stop the inevitable march of a highly
communicable and potentially deadly virus. Millions contracted
H1N1 within weeks of its detection,25 hundreds were reported
dead,26 and others have suffered economically, 27 emotionally,
or mentally.28 Lingering questions remain as to the reasons for
these failures to control infectious diseases globally during
public health emergencies. Many factors are at play–
inadequate or non-existent public health surveillance systems
in many countries, pre-existing lack of access to medical
services, insufficient medical personnel, lack of medical
treatment and supplies, and ill-designed vaccine distribution
systems. Costs and public apathy in some countries are also to
blame. Greece, for example, recently cancelled orders for an
additional 12 million doses of H1N1 vaccine in the face of
national budget deficits,29 even though only approximately 3%
23. Accord Presanis, supra note 2, at 9 (stating that study estimates
placed the H1N1 epidemic “within the lowest category of severity considered
in pandemic planning conducted prior to the appearance of [the virus] in the
United States”).
24. See Thom Patterson, Canada’s Olympic-Sized Plan to Fight H1N1,
CNN,
Jan.
18,
2010,
http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/01/13/olympics.flu.preps/ (last visited Apr.
8, 2010) (warning that the potential for H1N1 to re-emerge in the Spring of
2010 remains a possibility especially during international gatherings like the
Winter Olympics in Vancouver).
25. Mick Stobbe, CDC Reports 20 Percent of Americans Got Swine Flu
Vaccine, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2010, at A5. (estimating 55 million became ill
and 246,000 were hospitalized); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2009 H1N1 Early Outbreak and Disease Characteristics, (Oct. 27, 2009),
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/surveillanceqa.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010)
(estimating that over 1 million became ill between April and June 2009).
26. Stobbe, supra note 25.
27. See P.J. Huffstutter, Swine Flu? Please Don’t Call It That: Hog
Farmers, Already Hurting from the Recession, Say H1N1 Paranoia Has
Devastated Business, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2009, at A22 (reporting that the pork
industry has lost $1.5 billion since the virus was reported in April).
28. See James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., A Hidden Epidemic: The Legal
Environment Underlying Mental and Behavioral Health Preparedness in
Public Health Emergencies, __ ST. LOUIS UNIV. L. REV __ (2010) (forthcoming)
(on file with author).
29. Harry Papachristou, Greece Halts Purchases of H1N1 Flu Vaccines,
REUTERS,
Jan.
19,
2010,
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of its population is vaccinated.30 Despite H1N1’s potential to
kill, many people in developed countries like the United States
chose to forego vaccination even when vaccines became
plentiful.31 Elsewhere, countries ,where population threats like
malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malnourishment are
mainstays, did not prioritize H1N1 prevention.32
At least partially responsible for global inadequacies in
H1N1 responses are divergent legal responses authorizing a
range of antiquated, inconsistent, and uncoordinated public
health prevention and control measures. As explained in Part
II, while WHO and multiple member countries declared
various emergencies in response to H1N1, these declarations
authorized an array of measures that were not always welltargeted or well-implemented in controlling pandemic flu.
Worse still, some WHO member countries’ emergency laws
authorized government to act in ways that diverge from
principles of public health practice, science, ethics, and human
rights. WHO’s implementation of the IHRs, intended to provide
internationally-consistent standards for public health
emergency responses, did not necessarily guide the
independent exercise of national or regional emergency powers
among sovereign governments. Significant global health
objectives became mired in disputes over legal responsibility,
national sovereignty, and trade policies. Part III explains that
the resulting global legal quagmire is attributable in part to
failures in what I refer to as “global legal triage.” Defined
essentially as those efforts among international and national
leaders, legal counsel, and others to identify, prioritize, and

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE60I0RI20100119 (last visited Apr. 8,
2010).
30. S. Tsiodras et al., The Vaccination Campaign Against 2009 Pandemic
Influenza A(H1N1) and Its Continued Importance in View of the Uncertainty
Surrounding the Risk Associated with the Pandemic, EUROSURVEILLANCE,
Jan. 21, 2010, at 10, 10.
31. See Perri Klass, Fearing a Flu Vaccine, and Wanting More of It, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2009, at D5 (describing public fear of the H1N1 vaccine).
32. See Luis Gomes Sambo, Reg’l Dir. for Afr., World Health Org., Address
at the Opening of the African Conference on Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1)
2009
(Aug.
11,
2009)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.afro.who.int/en/rdo/speeches/1858-speech-by-dr-luis-gomes-samboat-the-opening-of-the-african-conference-on-pandemic-influenza-ah1n1.html)
(noting the difficulty of shifting funds to H1N1 preparedness from competing
public health priorities).
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solve transnational public health legal issues to improve global
health outcomes in real-time emergencies,33 global legal triage
is essential to protecting global health. National laws are core
to emergency responses, but do not allow for the type of
sustained, organized international responses that lead directly
to improved global health outcomes. What is missing
internationally is an enforceable global legal strategy that
prioritizes key decisions designed to protect the health of
populations beyond national borders. A brief conclusion follows.
II. INTERNATIONAL DECLARATIONS OF EMERGENCIES
Laws are indispensable to effective emergency response
efforts.34 On the national level, country-specific laws create the
public health infrastructure through which governments
detect, declare, and address emergencies. Laws determine not
only what constitutes a public health emergency, but also how
to respond through public and private actors.35 Assessing the
legal environment in declared states of public health
emergency, however, is complicated. Significant legal
challenges emerge nationally from the convergence of response
efforts of varied entities (e.g., public health agencies,
emergency management agencies, hospitals, non-profit
institutions) and actors (e.g., public health practitioners, health
care workers, law enforcers) at multiple levels of government
(e.g., national, regional, and local). Existing laws must be
interpreted and applied in real time during emergencies.36 New
laws and policies are triggered by or flow from the emergency
33. This definition is based in part on the existing definition of “legal
triage” applicable in domestic legal responses and espoused most recently as:
“those efforts by public health legal practitioners during declared emergencies
to ‘prioritize legal issues and solutions in real time that facilitate legitimate
public health responses.’” Hodge & Anderson, supra note 1, at 273 (citing
Hodge, supra note 1, at 631). This definition uses the term “triage” consistent
with its general meaning as “a process in which things are ranked in terms of
importance or priority[.]” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1840 (4th ed. 2000).
34. Anthony D. Moulton et al., What Is Public Health Legal
Preparedness?, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 672, 672, 674–75, 681 (2003).
35. See James G. Hodge, Jr., Assessing the Legal Environment Concerning
Mass Casualty Event Planning and Response, in MASS MEDICAL CARE WITH
SCARCE RESOURCES: A COMMUNITY PLANNING GUIDE 25, 27–29 (Sally J.
Phillips
&
Ann
Knebel
eds.
2006),
available
at
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/mce/mceguide.pdf.
36. See id. at 26.
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declaration itself.37 While advance knowledge of emergency
jurisprudence’s principles can help to answer many issues,
unique legal problems stem from the specific circumstances of
any emergency. These emerging legal dilemmas are not easily
resolved within any country during a public health emergency.
Now consider how these challenges escalate when a major
communicable disease threat goes global. Viral flu strains like
H1N1 do not respect international boundaries. In a global
economy with hundreds of thousands of persons and millions of
goods traversing continents daily, the spread of easilycommunicated diseases like H1N1 are predictable and
inevitable. It took only a few weeks for H1N1 to transition from
a localized threat to a global pandemic.38 Yet, emergency legal
responses among countries are less predictable. International
standards issued by WHO, the World Trade Organization
(WTO), and others on how to respond to global health threats
(1) allow significant deviations based on national
interpretations of law, policy, and science, and (2) respect
international variances in legal systems, politics, and cultures.
As a result, one country’s public health legal responses do not
necessarily mimic another’s, which leads to legal differences in
response capabilities. Resulting failures to effectively respond
to global health threats like H1N1 in some countries increase
risks for populations in other nations (even if those other
nations are working extensively to control emerging disease
threats).39

37. See Hodge, supra note 1, at 634–40 (describing various declarations
that can be issued at the state and federal levels and how those declarations
change their respective legal environments).
38. Margaret Chan, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., World Now at the Start
of 2009 Influenza Pandemic U.N. Doc. SG/SM/12309 (June 11, 2009)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_pandemic_phase
6_20090611/en/index.html).
39. See Tikki Pang & G. Emmanuel Guindon, Globalization and Risks to
Health, 5 EMBO REP.(SPECIAL ISSUE) S11, S14–15 (2004) (describing the
importance of revamping IHR to meet global challenges); Lawrence Gostin,
Fighting the Flu With One Hand Tied, WASH. POST, May 1, 2009, at A21
(noting that viruses often originate in Asia or other poor regions where
detection capabilities are not as advanced as those in wealthier nations); Ban
Ki-moon, Sec’y-Gen., United Nations, Address to the Forum on Global Health:
The Tie That Binds (June 15, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2009/sgsm12309.doc.htm) (noting the
necessity of a global coordinated response to H1N1).
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Ill-advised legal responses to transnational risks may be
hastily crafted in real-time in ways that are detrimental to
global health, trade, and populations. For example, at the
inception of the H1N1 pandemic in April 2009, authorities in
China used their quarantine laws to sequester a group of
seventy or so Mexican tourists visiting their country.40 Some of
these individuals and others were held for several days at a
local hotel41 even though there was insufficient information to
suggest they had H1N1 or had been exposed to individuals
believed to be infected with the virus. Additional countries like
Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, and Cuba issued legal mandates to
temporarily cancel all outgoing flights to Mexico,42 even though
WHO recommended against similar travel restrictions.43 Cuban
authorities reportedly also authorized military soldiers and
other personnel to close highways, isolate neighborhoods, and
go door-to-door to enforce mandatory quarantines and
evacuations door-to-door as needed.44 The Tunisian government
prohibited its citizens from traveling to Mecca in October for
the annual pilgrimage because of a lack of H1N1 vaccine.45
Russian and other national authorities blatantly violated WTO
policies by banning all pork imports from the United States and
other countries for a limited time, despite the lack of a public
health justification for the ban (because H1N1 cannot be spread
through the consumption of pork products).46 Despite the lack
of any substantiated threat to the public’s health, the Egyptian
government ordered the slaughter of several hundred thousand
pigs at the onset of the pandemic, at significant cost to local

40. Andrew Browne, China Forces Dozens of Mexican Travelers into
Quarantine, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2009, at A14.
41. Id.
42. Marc Lacey & Andrew Jacobs, Even as Fears of Flu Ebb, Mexicans
Feel Stigma, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2009, at A1 (reporting that Mexican
diplomats were angered by the suspension of flights from Mexico by four Latin
American nations—Argentina, Peru, Ecuador and Cuba—in response to the
flu outbreak).
43. Browne, supra note 40.
44. James Anderson, The Flu Pandemic: Cuban Civil Defense Teams Keep
Flu at Bay, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 4, 2009, at 23.
45. Citizens Barred from Making Hajj, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2009, at A28.
46. Jonathan Lynn, Swine Flu Alert Prompts Pork Import Bans, REUTERS,
Apr. 27, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN27548150 (last visited
Apr. 8, 2010).
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farmers who were not paid for their losses.47
Although these examples are limited to specific
jurisdictions, they exemplify a fundamental weakness of global
legal efforts to respond to H1N1 flu. Specifically, there is no
definitive, enforceable legal framework to control emergency,
communicable disease threats globally. As discussed below, the
most comprehensive, modern approach to controlling infectious
diseases has been developed by the WHO in the 2005 revision
of its International Health Regulations (IHRs). Though
extensive, purposeful, and endorsed by WHO member
countries,48 the central flaw of the IHRs remains their
enforceability.49 The regulations constitute a guide more than a
legal mandate during pandemics. National emergency and
public health laws govern in default. As documented in Table
1, below, however, emergency laws and responses among
sovereign countries vary extensively. In combination,
implementation of international and national laws to address
global health threats like H1N1 in real-time emergencies is at
best reactionary.
A. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL HEALTH
REGULATIONS
On April 25, 2009, at the inception of the H1N1 pandemic,
WHO Director-General Dr. Margaret Chan sought the counsel
of WHO’s Emergency Committee and quickly declared a public
health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) pursuant
to the IHRs.50 The Director-General’s decision was preemptive
and unprecedented. This was the first time that WHO declared
a PHEIC under its new, revised standards.51

47. Gostin, supra note 5, at 2378; Egypt Orders Slaughter of All Pigs over
Swine Flu: No Cases Reported in the Country; Some Farmers Refusing to
Cooperate, MSNBC, Apr. 29, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30480507/
(last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
48. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT
THE
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005), available at
http://www.who.int/ihr/about/FAQ2009.pdf (explaining that IHR are binding
on all countries, including all WHO member states).
49. See Gostin, supra note 5, at 2377 (stating that failure to comply with
norms was a reason behind the revision to the IHR, however the new
regulations also provide little enforcement authority to the WHO).
50. Press Release, Chan, supra note 4.
51. Katz, supra note 5, at 1167.

HODGE_MACROS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

GLOBAL LEGAL TRIAGE

6/10/2010 2:33 PM

609

Finalized by the World Health Assembly on May 23, 2005
following lessons learned during the 2003 Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic, 52 a revamped version
of the IHRs only became effective on June 15, 2007.53 Shedding
the antiquated premises of its original conception in the 1960s,
the modern purpose of the IHRs are to “prevent, protect
against, control, and provide a public health response to the
international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate
with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid
unnecessary interference with international traffic and
trade.”54 In setting international standards for disease control
and prevention, the new IHRs reject the disease-specific
approach of prior iterations (which focused only on three
diseasescholera, plague, and yellow fever)55 and adopt an “all
hazards” approach.56 The revised IHRs apply broadly to
naturally occurring infectious diseases, chemical or radiological
elements, bioterrorism, and other global threats to the public’s
health.57
The IHRs provide a host of public health powers to control
these threats, including international public health
surveillance, vaccinations, medical examinations, quarantine,
isolation, and restrictions on human travelers and trade.58
Coextensively, they incorporate human rights norms in
counter-balance to the use of these and other public health
powers. Human rights protections include the need to respect
human dignity and freedoms, provide a right to health for
quarantined or isolated individuals, protect against
unwarranted discrimination, ensure transparency, and

52. See David P. Fidler & Lawrence O. Gostin, The New International
Health Regulations: An Historic Development for International Law and
Public Health, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 85 (2006).
53. Jessica L. Sturtevant et al., The New International Health
Regulations: Considerations for Global Public Health Surveillance, 1 DISASTER
MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 117, 117 (2007).
54. World Health Org., International Health Regulations (2005), at art. 1,
WHA58.3, (May 23, 2005) [hereinafter IHR (2005)].
55. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 48, at 1.
56. See IHR (2005), at art. 1 (defining “disease” as encompassing any
illness or medical condition “that presents or could present a significant harm
to humans).
57. See id.
58. See, e.g., id. at arts. 5, 23, 31.
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promote privacy of identifiable health data.59 Before a public
health measure may restrict civil or political human rights, the
IHRs have been interpreted to require that the measure60
must: “(1) respond to a pressing public or social need; (2)
pursue a legitimate aim; (3) be proportionate to the legitimate
aim; and (4) be no more restrictive than necessary to achieve
the purpose sought by restricting the right.”61 Though
meaningful, human rights protections under the IHRs fall
short in two key ways. First, due process protections in the use
of compulsory public health powers are not explicitly spelled
out.62 Second, a human rights requirement to employ least
restrictive alternatives to coercive public health powers applies
only to the use of medical exams, not other compulsory powers
like vaccination, isolation, or quarantine.63
WHO member countries are required to notify WHO of
events constituting a PHEIC within twenty-four hours of their
receipt of evidence that identifies an extraordinary event
which is determined to (1) “constitute a public health risk to
other states through the international spread of disease”; and
(2) “potentially require a coordinated international
response[.]”64 As unusual instances of respiratory, flu-like
illnesses began to emerge in March 2009, Mexican health
authorities properly notified the Pan-American Health
Organization (PAHO), the regional arm of WHO covering the
Americas.65 PAHO transmitted these data to WHO in
Geneva.66 Once a PHEIC is declared, WHO’s Director-General
can:
 Independently assess and verify disease prevalence in

59. See id. at arts. 3, 32, 42, 45.
60. See Fidler & Gostin, supra note 52, at 87.
61. Id. (citing U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’m on
Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on the
Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, ¶¶ 10–11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 (Sep. 28, 1984)).
62. See IHR (2005), at art. 23 (stating that no health measure under the
IHR shall be carried out except in accordance with the law and international
obligations of the State Party).
63. See id. at art. 23.
64. See id. at arts. 1, 6.
65. Katz, supra note 5, at 1166.
66. See id. at 1167.
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countries with assistance from non-governmental
organizations;
 Share data with other countries to help with
international response efforts; and
 Issue temporary (non-binding) recommendations to
countries on the most appropriate ways to respond,
including health measures to be taken by affected
countries and countries not directly affected.67
Countries may follow WHO’s guidance in their discretion.
The IHRs stipulate only that countries must not (1) mandate
invasive procedures as a condition of entry for any traveler; (2)
require health documentation for travelers other than those
authorized in the IHRs or by WHO;68 (3) impose health
measures that are more restrictive than the IHRs without
adequate scientific or WHO guidance; or (4) unnecessarily
restrict international traffic or trade.69
The primary flaw of the IHRs are not WHO’s failure to set
forth reasonably sound provisions for international disease
control. Throughout the H1N1 pandemic, WHO worked with
real-time surveillance information to generate guidance for
global emergency response efforts based on existing public
health science and practice. The problem lies in their
enforcement. The IHRs provide guidance, not mandates.70
Compliance with the regulations is essentially voluntary,71
although member states have strong incentives to adhere to
retain their WHO status and avoid public censure. Yet there

67. See IHR (2005), at arts. 10, 12, 15–17.
68. See id. at art 23. Concerning international travelers, countries may
require for public health purposes, upon departure or arrival, information on
the traveler’s destination or itinerary; a non-invasive medical examination;
and inspection of bags, cargo, containers, mail, and human remains. Id.
Pursuant to Article 31, “invasive medical examinations, vaccination or other
prophylaxis shall not be required as a condition of entry” unless they are (1)
“necessary to determine whether a public health risk exists;” (2) a condition of
entry for a traveler seeking temporary or permanent residence; (3) consistent
with country-specific health measures that comply with Article 43; or (4)
implemented consistent with Article 23. Id. at arts. 31, 43.
69. See id. at art. 43.
70. See Gostin, supra note 5, at 2377.
71. See Sturtevant et al., supra note 53, at 120 (“The WHO has no formal
means by which to enforce the IHR.”); Gostin, supra note 39 (“[T]he
frightening truth is that the WHO has no real power”).
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are no direct funds, even for the poorest nations, accompanying
national endorsements of the IHRs.72 Nor do the IHRs require
member countries to build national surveillance capacity.73
Furthermore, as a concession to national sovereignty, the IHRs
specifically allow countries to legislate in pursuit of their own
health
policies
under
principles
of
national
law,
notwithstanding inconsistencies with the Regulations’
standards.74 As discussed below, this is exactly what countries
have done.
B. COUNTRY-SPECIFIC INTERNATIONAL DECLARATIONS
Within any country there is a slate of emergency laws and
policies that may be triggered through declarations of states of
emergency, disaster, public health emergency, or other terms.75
In the United States, multiple federal laws address
emergencies, including those arising from public health
threats.76 Federal laws authorize declarations of (1) a general
emergency, (2) a disaster, and (3) a public health emergency.
Declarations of emergency77 or disaster78 authorized by the

72. See IHR (2005), at arts. 5, 13 (suggesting that countries develop,
strengthen, and maintain core public health capacities to detect, assess, notify,
and report events, and to respond promptly and effectively to public health
risks and emergencies of international concern); see also Gostin, supra note 5,
at 2377 (“[P]recious little has been devoted to build [surveillance and
response] capacity in poor countries.”).
73. Fidler & Gostin, supra note 52, at 88 (“The new IHR also contain no
obligations on states parties to provide financial and technical resources to
support capacity-building.”).
74. See Fidler, supra note 4 (“The IHR 2005 do not preclude States Parties
from implementing measures that achieve a greater level of health protection
than WHO temporary recommendations . . . .”).
75. While there are important distinctions between the terms disaster,
emergency, public health emergency, or like terms as used in existing
statutory or regulatory frameworks, this article does not attempt to delineate
these distinctions for the purposes of emergency responses to public health
threats like H1N1. For more information concerning U.S. distinctions among
these terms, see Hodge & Anderson, supra note 1, at 255–69.
76. See id. at 255–63 (documenting the extensive range of federal laws
implicated in national emergencies).
77. In general, the President can declare a state of emergency under the
Stafford Act only after a state governor requests federal assistance “to save
lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert
the threat of a catastrophe. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 5122(1), 5191 (2006). What
constitutes an emergency is broad and may apply to a wide range of incidents.
For example, President Clinton declared a state of emergency in 2000 to
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Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act,79 must be issued by the President.80 Pursuant to the Public
Health Service Act,81 the declaration of a public health
emergency may be issued by the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS).82 In response to the
national threat of H1N1, DHHS declared a state of public
health emergency on April 26, 2009.83 Only later, on October
23, 2009, did President Obama declare a state of national
emergency.84 Together, these declarations changed the legal

contain West Nile Virus in New York and New Jersey. SARAH A. LISTER,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL
RESPONSE TO DISASTERS: FEDERAL AUTHORITY AND FUNDING 4 (2007). Once
declared, the Stafford Act provides the President with expansive power to
authorize temporary housing, to provide financial assistance for individuals,
and to issue new rules and regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 5192 (2006).
78. The President can declare a state of disaster pursuant to the Stafford
Act upon the request of a governor during a more extreme crisis involving:
any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm,
high water, winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake,
volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or,
regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the
United States, which in the determination of the President causes
damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major
disaster assistance . . . to supplement the efforts and available
resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief
organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering
caused thereby.
42 U.S.C. § 5122(2), 5170 (2006). During a declared disaster, federal agencies
may support local and state response efforts, but can also directly coordinate
response efforts of federal agencies, private entities, and state and local
governments. Id. at § 5170a.
79. Id. at §§ 5121–5205.
80. Id. at §§ 5170, 5191.
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–300 (2006).
82. Id. at § 247d(a). “Public health emergency” is not specifically defined
in the Act. Instead, DHHS’s Secretary has wide discretion to determine when
“a disease or disorder presents a public health emergency; or . . . a public
health emergency, including significant outbreaks of infectious diseases or
bioterrorist attacks, otherwise exists . . . .” Id. Upon declaration, the Secretary
can make or enter grants or contracts, provide awards for expenses, and
conduct and support investigations into the cause, treatment, or prevention of
a disease or disorder. Id.; see generally Jennifer Ray, Federal Declaration of a
Public Health Emergency, 7 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM 251 (2009)
(describing the procedure for and legal events that accompany declaration of a
public health emergency).
83. Press Release, Johnson, supra note 6.
84. Proclamation No. 8443, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,439 (Oct. 23, 2009).
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landscape for H1N1 response efforts nationally,85 authorizing
various federal powers to acquire and distribute resources and
requiring federal agencies like DHHS and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)86 to coordinate national response
efforts.
Other countries’ emergency declarations in response to
H1N1 empower their emergency management, public health,
and law enforcement authorities to respond in different ways.
The table below provides a brief synopsis of select countries’
emergency declarations and resulting legal powers.
Table. Select Examples of National Emergency
Declarations in Response to H1N1
Date

4/25/09

Country

Mexico

Declaration

Emergency
Decree

Select Authorization of
Powers
Government may regulate
transportation; suspend
public events; enter any home
or building for inspection;
order quarantines; and assign
authorities and health
professionals to conduct
certain tasks. Thomas Black,
Mexico’s Calderon Declares
Emergency amid Swine Flu
Outbreak, BLOOMBERG.COM,
Apr. 25, 2009,

85. See James G. Hodge, Jr. & Brooke Courtney, Assessing the Legal
Standard of Care in Public Health Emergencies, 303 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 361,
361 (2010) (stating that after declarations of a national emergency and public
health emergency in response to H1N1, DHHS was authorized “to waive or
conditionally set aside or modify certain federal program requirements and
disable federal law requiring hospitals to screen patients seeking emergency
services on site”).
86. DHS is responsible for organizing federal response capabilities
through the formulation of the National Response Plan (NRP) to manage
domestic incidents across all levels of government through prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery activities. Press Release, Office of the
Press Sec’y, The White House, Homeland Security Presidential
Directive/HSPD-5
(Feb.
28,
2003),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html. The NRP was recently
superseded by the National Response Framework (“NRF”) in March 2008. See
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 2–3, 79
(2008), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf.
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http://bloomberg.com/apps/ne
ws?id=20670001&sid=aEsNo
wnABJ6Q&pid=20601087
(last visited Apr. 8, 2010).

4/26/09
Renewed
12/28/09
10/01/09
7/24/09

DHHS may take such action
as appropriate including:
making grants; providing
awards for expenses; entering
into contracts; and
conducting and supporting
investigations into the cause,
treatment, or prevention of a
disease. http://www.hhs.gov
Public Health
/secretary/phe_swh1n1.html
Emergency
(last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
United
States
National
Emergency
Declaration

10/23/09

4/27/09

Colombia

4/28/09

Costa Rica

State of
Emergency

National
Health
Emergency

DHHS may temporarily
waive or modify certain
requirements of Medicare or
Medicaid reimbursement
policies, as well as
requirements under the State
Children’s Insurance
Program, the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Labor
Act (EMTALA), and the
HIPAA Privacy Rule.
Proclamation No. 8443, 74
Fed. Reg. 55,439 (Oct. 23,
2009).
Government may budget and
distribute special resources to
contain and mitigate the
impact of H1N1. Adriaan
Alsema, Columbia Declares
State of Emergency over
Swine Flu Threat, COLOMBIA
REPORTS, Apr. 27, 2009,
available at
http://colombiareports.com/col
ombia-news/news/3775colombia-declares-state-ofemergency-over-swine-fluthreat.html.
Government may reinforce
prevention, vigilance, and
medical attention; health
officials may issue restrictive
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measures to prevent the
illness from spreading.
Government Declares a
Health Emergency in Costa
Rica, INSIDE COSTA RICA,
Apr. 29, 2009,
http://insidecostarica.com/dail
ynews/2009/april/29/nac01.ht
m (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).

4/29/09

4/30/09
Renewed
8/27/09

8/17/09

Ecuador

Nicaragua

Malaysia

State of
Emergency

State of
Emergency

National
Health
Emergency

Government shall coordinate
efforts and to take necessary
measures; bar entry by
foreigners who have been to
Mexico and suspend charter
flights to Mexico. Ecuador
Declares State of Emergency
Due to Swine Flu Alert,
CHINA VIEW, Apr. 29, 2009,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/en
glish/200904/30/content_11286242.htm
(last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
Government activates an
inter-agency committee to
develop and implement
emergency plans for rapid
and appropriate care. Enact
National Health Emergency
Nicaragua: Interinstitutional
Commission is reactive with
human influenza, NICARAGUA
TODAY, Aug. 27, 2009,
deathshttp://www.nicaraguah
oy.info/dir_cgi/topics.cgi?op=v
iew_topic;cat=NoticiasGenera
les;id=57516 (last visited May
4, 2010).
Government may order any
person to treatment,
immunization, isolation or
observation, as well as order
the destruction of structures
that are incapable of being
thoroughly disinfected.
A(H1N1): 2 More Die, Health
Curfew if Mortality Rate
Reaches 0.4pc, STAR ONLINE,
Aug. 17, 2009,
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http://thestar.com.my/news/st
ory.asp?file=/2009/8/17/nation
/20090817103540&sec=natio
n (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).

11/02/09

Afghanistan

State of
Health
Emergency

Government required all
educational institutions
closed for several weeks and
advised against public
against gatherings.
Afghanistan declares H1N1
Emergency, Shuts Schools,
REUTERS, Nov. 2, 2009,
available at
http://www.reuters.com/articl
e/idUSTRE5A115V20091102.

Of those countries that formally declared states of
emergency, most relied on general emergency powers tailored
to address specific public health threats. Other countries,
including Afghanistan, Costa Rica, Malaysia, and the United
States, declared specific states of health emergency. The timing
and scope of these general and “health-related” emergency
declarations are noteworthy. Not surprisingly, Mexico was the
first country to issue an emergency decree on April 25, 2009.87
With multiple, identified deaths from H1N1 influenza already
documented, Mexico’s President Felipe Calderon pledged to
take “all the measures necessary to respond with efficiency and
opportunity to this respiratory epidemic.”88 Governmental
offices, schools, business, theaters, and museums were closed
for over two weeks.89 The President’s decree also bestowed
additional authority to control transportation, enter private
property, and order quarantines.90
Following the U.S. declaration of public health emergency
87. Focus: Swine Flu, Timeline: H1N1 Outbreak, ALJAZEERA.NET, June
15,
2009,
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2009/05/200952105136198276.html
(last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
88. Thomas Black, Mexico’s Calderon Declares Emergency amid Swine Flu
Apr.
25,
2009,
Outbreak,
BLOOMBERG.COM,
http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?id=20670001&sid=aEsNownABJ6Q&pid=206
01087 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
89. See id.
90. Id.
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on April 26, 2009,91 Colombia issued a state of emergency on
April 27 despite not identifying a single case of H1N1 in the
country.92 Colombian authorities in Bogota used their authority
and infusion of new resources stemming from the declaration to
prepare for anticipated cases.93 After finding only two domestic
cases of H1N1 infection, Costa Rica declared a national health
emergency on April 28, 2009, authorizing the expenditure of
five million dollars for public health efforts94 and
recommending that citizens cancel trips to Mexico.95 Like
Columbia, Ecuador issued a preemptive state of emergency on
April 29 despite the lack of confirmed cases.96 Unlike Columbia,
Ecuador immediately instituted a policy prohibiting flights to
and from Mexico and barring foreigners who had recently
visited Mexico from entering the country.97 Nicaragua
President Daniel Ortega issued a largely preemptive decree of
health emergency on April 29, 2009, noting “[t]he threat is for
everyone, no country is exempt[.]”98 A month later, on May 29,
Venezuela issued its declaration of emergency after a single
case was confirmed.99
While these countries largely took a preventive approach to
H1N1 influenza in quickly declaring states of emergency prior
to or soon after detecting initial cases of H1N1, others largely
waited to assess the spread and impact of H1N1. Chile did not

91. See Press Release, Johnson, supra note 6.
92. Adriaan Alsema, Columbia Declares State of Emergency over Swine
Flu Threat, COLOMBIA REPORTS, Apr. 27, 2009, available at
http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/3775-colombia-declares-stateof-emergency-over-swine-flu-threat.html.
93. See id.
94. Vanessa I. Garnica, Costa Rica Allots $5 Million to Fight Flu, THE
TICO TIMES, Apr. 30, 2009, available at LexisNexis Academic (last visited May
3, 2010).
95. Francisco Jara, With Two Flu Cases, Cost[a] Rica Calls National
Health Emergency, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 29, 2009, available at
LexisNexis Academic (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
96. Ecuador Declares State of Emergency Due to Swine Flu Alert, CHINA
VIEW,
Apr.
29,
2009,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200904/30/content_11286242.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
97. Id.
98. Nicaragua in State of Health Emergency for 2 Months over Flu,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Apr. 30, 2009, available at LexisNexis Academic
(last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
99. Venezuela: Venezuela Declares State of Emergency to Avoid A/H1N1
Spread, THAI PRESS REPORTS, June 1, 2009 (on file with author).
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issue its health emergency decree until June 14, 2009 after
identifying two H1N1 deaths and over 2,300 confirmed cases.100
The Yemeni Ministry of Health declared a state of emergency
on June 16 in response to its initial cases of H1N1 infections.101
Health authorities in Yemen targeted air travel as part of its
prevention strategy, vowing, “[n]o international air passenger
should be exempt from screening.”102 With over 4,200 confirmed
cases, Malaysian authorities declared a state of national health
emergency on August 17, 2009. Its declaration generated a
series of systematic responses designed to mitigate the further
spread of H1N1 influenza.103 These included various travel
warnings, requirements for citizens with flu-like symptoms to
wear face masks in public, and self-quarantine as needed.
Authorities suggested that additional measures, including a
“health curfew” as proposed in Mexico may be implemented.104
Torn by war, violence, and poverty in the modern era, Afghan
authorities declared a state of health emergency on November
2, 2009 after registering more than 300 positive cases of H1N1
in the country.105 Schools were ordered closed for three weeks,
106 even though such a social distancing strategy was rejected
by CDC for implementation in the United States.107

100. Chile Decrees Emergency Measures After A/H1N1 Infections Reach
2,337, CHINA VIEW, June 14, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200906/15/content_11544285.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
101. First Swine Flu Case in Yemen Confirmed; Ministry of Health Declares
Emergency Nationwide, YEMEN POST, June 16, 2009, available at
http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=100&SubID=901&Main
Cat=8; World Health Organization, New Influenza A (H1N1) in Eastern
Mediterranean Region Number of Laboratory-Confirmed Cases and Deaths
Reported
to
WHO,
available
at
http://reliefweb.int/rw/fullmaps_sa.nsf/luFullMap/8B3780DA9A323023C12576
030040D7DA/$File/map.pdf?OpenElement (last visited May 4, 2010).
102. Salma Ismail, Yemen Reports Five Swine Flu Cases, YEMEN TIMES,
June 17, 2009, http://yementimes.com/defaultdet.aspx?SUB_ID=30051 (last
visited Apr. 8, 2010) .
103. Himanshu Bhatt, A(H1N1): National Health Emergency Declared,
SUN2SURF: MALAYSIAN SOURCE FOR NEWS & LIFESTYLE, Aug. 17, 2009,
available at http://www.thesundaily.com/article.cfm?id=37019.
104. Id.
105. Afghanistan Declares H1N1 Emergency, Shuts Schools, REUTERS, Nov.
2,
2009,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5A115V20091102.
106. Id.
107. Maryn McKenna & Lisa Schnirring, CDC, States Weigh Usefulness of
NEWS,
May
4,
2009,
School
Closures,
CIDRAP
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Considerable, additional legal activity in response to the
H1N1 pandemic occurred at the subnational level. In the
United States, since September 11, 2001, at least twenty-seven
states108 have legislatively defined and authorized the
declaration of a “public health emergency.”109 Many of these
states’ laws mirror provisions in the Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act (MSEHPA),110 drafted by the Centers for
Law and the Public’s Health following the anthrax exposures in
the Fall of 2001.111 MSEHPA offers flexible, model language
setting forth potential powers for responding to a public health
emergency.112 During the H1N1 outbreak, governors or other
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/panflu/news/may0409sch
ools-jw.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) (reporting that school closures were no
longer effective at preventing spread of the virus).
108. These jurisdictions include: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 31-9-3 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2009); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 18.05.070(2) (2008); Arizona, ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-787 (2009); California, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8558 (West 2005 &
Supp. 2010); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-131 (West Supp.
2009); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3132 (2005); District of Columbia,
D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2304.01 (LexisNexis 2008); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
381.00315(1)(b) (West 2007); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-3(6) (Supp. 2009);
Illinois, 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3305/4 (West 2008); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 135.140(6) (West 2007); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:762(12) (2007);
Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 801 (2004 & Supp. 2009); Maryland, MD
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 14-3A-01 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); Massachusetts,
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 17, § 2A (LexisNexis 1999); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:13-2 (West 2007); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-10A-3(G) (West
2003 & Supp. 2009); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-475 (2009);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 6104 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010);
Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 433.441 (West Supp. 2009); South Carolina,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-130(P) (Supp. 2009); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 34-22-41 (2004); Texas, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.003
(Vernon Supp. 2009); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-23b-102(6) (Supp. 2009);
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.16 (Supp. 2009) (“public health threat”);
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.119A.020 (West Supp. 2010);
Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 166.02 (West Supp. 2009); and Wyoming, WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 35-4-115 (2009).
109. See generally Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act: Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally
Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 622, 622–23, 625 (2002)
(discussing how MSEHPA authorizes the declaration of a public health
emergency).
110. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (Ctrs. for Law & the
Public’s Health at Georgetown & Johns Hopkins Univs., 2001).
111. Gostin et al., supra note 109, at 622–23.
112. See MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 104(m). “Public
health emergency” is defined as:
An occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition that: (1) is
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leaders in at least twelve states formally declared states of
emergency or public health emergency.113 Hong Kong, China
issued its own declaration of public health emergency modeled
after MSEHPA on May 1, 2009 pursuant to its Prevention and
Control of Disease Ordinance.114 China’s Shandong Province
declared a “second-level health emergency” on May 13, 2009.115
During the month of August, at least five Indian states and
territories (Maharashtra,116 Tamil Nadu,117 Haryana,118
believed to be caused by . . . (i) bioterrorism; (ii) the appearance of a novel or
previously controlled or eradicated infectious agent or biological toxin; . . . and
(2) poses a high probability of . . . (i) a large number of deaths in the affected
population;(ii) a large number of serious or long-term disabilities in the
affected population; or (iii) widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent
that poses a significant risk of substantial future harm to a large number of
people in the affected population.
Id. During a public health emergency declared pursuant to MSEHPA, (1)
government is vested with new and expedited powers such as the ability of a
state’s governor to suspend the operation of existing laws that may interfere
with effective emergency responses, id. at § 403(a); (2) individuals are entitled
to enhanced public health services, such as expedited access to medicines,
vaccines, or other resources, id. at § 505(d); (3) responders may be authorized
to act in ways that differ from non-emergency situations, including practicing
medicine with out-of-state licenses, id. at § 608; and, (4) volunteers and other
emergency responders are protected from some forms of civil liability, id. at §
804(b).
113. Pub. Health L. & Pol’y Program, Ariz. St. Univ., supra note 6. Those
states are as follows: Maryland, New York, Illinois, Ohio, Iowa, Florida,
Nebraska, Wisconsin, Maine, Texas, California, and Virginia. Id. Although
these states represent a minority of U.S. jurisdictions, their combined
populations comprise over 50% of the U.S. population. See U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 2010, at tbl.13 (2010).
114. Prevention and Control of Disease Ordinance, (2008) Cap. 599, § 8.
(H.K.),
available
at
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_ind.nsf/CurAllEngDoc/0B97283F997976774
825749F003142D1?OpenDocument. Pursuant to this ordinance, modeled in
part on MSEHPA, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive in Council may make
regulations to prevent, combat, or alleviate the effects of a public health
emergency. Id. Regulations may require: (1) disclosure by individuals of
information that is relevant to handling the public health emergency; (2)
disclosure by public officers to the public of information that is relevant to
handling the public health emergency; (3) requisition of property; and (4)
“appointment of any person to act as a medical or health professional, the
control of such appointed person, and deeming such appointed person to be
registered under any enactment[.]”
115. See China’s Shandong Quarantines 23, Declares Health Emergency
over A/H1N1 Flu, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, May 15, 2009,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90782/90880/6658293.html
(last
visited Apr. 8, 2010).
116. Maharashtra Invokes Epidemic Act to Check Swine Flu, DAILY NEWS
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Delhi,119 and Gujarat120) invoked emergency provisions of their
respective public health or epidemic disease acts.121
While these countries’ national and regional emergency
declarations provide examples of the types of emergency legal
powers that were instituted in response to H1N1, most WHO
member countries did not declare any formal state of
emergency despite WHO’s rapid declaration of a PHEIC.
Instead, they relied on implementation of national or regional
pandemic flu plans, use of existing domestic public health laws
and policies, and guidance from WHO, border countries, and
others to lead their response efforts. Notable is the divergence
in legal and policy approaches to pandemic flu responses among
the majority of WHO member states as contrasted with select
nations that instituted emergency legal responses. Emergency
declarations typically authorize countries to respond
domestically to public health threats in expedited ways.
Whether public health legal responses among countries that
declared emergencies exceeded or were more (or less) effective
in controlling the spread of H1N1 than countries which did not
&
ANALYSIS,
Aug.
4,
2009,
http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report_maharashtra-invokes-epidemic-actto-check-swine-flu_1279630 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) .
117. H1N1: TN Govt Bans Home Quarantine, TIMES OF INDIA, Oct. 13,
2009,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/H1N1-TN-govt-banshome-quarantine/articleshow/5118134.cms (last visited Apr. 8, 2010)
(reporting that the Tamil Nadu government used powers under Public Health
Act to proscribe ineffective health measures like home quarantines).
118. Haryana Invokes Epidemic Act, TIMES OF INDIA, Aug. 11, 2009,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Haryana-invokes-EpidemicAct/articleshow/4881209.cms (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
119. Epidemic Act in Place but Some Hospitals Fail to Toe Govt Line,
OF
INDIA,
Aug.
12,
2009,
TIMES
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Epidemic-Act-in-place-but-somehospitals-fail-to-toe-govt-line/articleshow/4887156.cms (last visited Apr. 8,
2010).
120. Modi Govt. Invokes Epidemic Act, as 9 Fresh Cases of H1N1 Reported,
THAINDIAN NEWS, Aug. 19, 2009, http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/indianews/modi-govt-invokes-epidemic-act-as-9-fresh-cases-of-h1n1reported_100235035.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
121. In another state in India, Andhra Pradesh, it was reported that a man
died of H1N1 after a private hospital refused to treat him. See Swine Flu
Oct.
7,
2009,
Death:
Notice
Served
on
Hospital,
HINDU,
http://www.thehindu.com/2009/10/07/stories/2009100758310300.htm
(last
visited Apr. 8, 2010) (reporting that authorities at the private hospital have
been questioned as to why the patient was discharged and not treated after he
was initially on a ventilator).
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similarly declare emergencies has not been assessed.
III. GLOBAL HEALTH LAW IN REAL-TIME
Legal responses to global health emergencies are
unpredictable because national emergency laws, even when
declared, feature different legal approaches and appreciation
for global responsibilities. The IHRs come as close as possible to
a “one size fits all” approach to controlling infectious diseases
that pose significant transnational public health threats. The
IHRs, however, clearly allow for dissimilar public health
practices among sovereigns.122 So they must, at least until
member countries divest their national sovereignty to bestow
stronger enforcement powers on WHO123 similar to powers
possessed by the WTO.124 Lacking an enforceable international
code for all nations as to how to respond in real time, the
default globally is to defer to specific WHO member countries’
emergency and public health laws. This is not always a
weakness. Though the public health threat of a highly
communicable virus like H1N1 may not respect boundaries, it
does not impact countries equally. Industrialized nations with
sophisticated national health systems may not require the
same type of public health legal responses to control the spread
of disease that are needed in developing countries lacking
resources and personnel to test, screen, and treat individuals.
To the extent emergency laws focus on flexibility and real-time
responsiveness, they tend to offer multiple options without
requiring specific actions.125 Their strength is how they can
encourage
and
authorize
innovative,
non-traditional
responses;126 their weakness is how their application can lead
to global injustices, abuses, and confusion during
emergencies.127

122. See Fidler, supra note 4.
123. Sturtevant et al., supra note 53, at 120 (“Legal enforcement of the IHR
remains problematic in the absence of sanctions . . . .”).
124. See, e.g.,WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 55–58 (4th
ed. 2008) (explaining that the WTO can impose sanctions on states that do not
comply with the WTO dispute settlement process).
125. See Hodge, supra note 1, at 627–29.
126. See Hodge & Anderson, supra note 1, at 272.
127. See Gostin, supra note 5, at 2376 (suggesting that the global response
to H1N1 raises “serious questions of global justice, as Mexicans have become
subject to stigma and discrimination”).
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Dissimilarities inherent in sovereign emergency laws are
not the problem per se until a localized public health threat like
H1N1 globalizes and requires transnational legal responses.
National legal responses during the earliest stages of the H1N1
pandemic may respond to domestic objectives but may also
devalue the need for global responses in real-time events. The
ease of transmissibility of conditions like H1N1 in a global
economy exposes these flaws. Even the strongest national
public health system capable of initially controlling disease
within a country’s borders cannot contain threats that arise
outside its sovereign domain.
The missing elements underlying the global control of
infectious diseases like H1N1 is clearly not a lack of national
legal powers nor a lack of global health strategies. Most
country’s domestic emergency powers are sufficiently broad to
address their specific public health objectives, although they
may be used in invidious ways contrary to public health
practice. As noted above, the majority of WHO member states
did not choose to evoke formal emergency powers in response to
H1N1, relying instead on existing public health powers and
pandemic flu preparedness plans. Although “the new IHR[s]
are no ‘magic bullet’ for global health problems,”128 they do offer
global standards that most nations respect, at least
superficially.129 What is truly lacking, however, is the
willingness and capacity of leaders and other actors nationally
to implement strategic responses to protect global health in the
face of emerging international threats. What I define as “global
legal triage,” refers to efforts of international and national
leaders and others to identify, prioritize, and solve
transnational public health legal issues to improve global
health
outcomes
in
real-time
during
international
emergencies.130
Global legal triage necessitates legal counsel and leaders
primarily at the international or national levels to generate
legal solutions to transnational issues that impact global health
in real-time emergencies. Questions of law and governance
relating to global allocation of scarce resources and personnel,

128. Fidler & Gostin, supra note 52, at 93.
129. Id. (“The revised [IHR] promise to become a centerpiece for global
health governance in the 21st century.”).
130. See supra note 33.
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limitations on individual travel or entry, or restrictions on
commerce and trade require strategic responses that reflect
global health priorities, not just national ones. Addressing
these global legal challenges in actual emergencies is hampered
by the altered legal environment inherent in national
emergency declarations, the exigencies of protecting domestic
public health, and the entrenchment that occurs when political
leaders face unsure and potentially catastrophic threats to
their populations. Primary attention to the public health
impacts on domestic populations is understandably at the
center of national efforts. Yet when national legal responses fail
to match international infectious disease standards set forth in
the IHRs, public health risks initially addressed in one country
inevitably transfer to other populations. Countries that
institute significant emergency response efforts to stymie the
spread of disease may initially proclaim hollow victories. Over
the long-term, however, infectious disease “never dies or
disappears for good.”131 In the case of H1N1, short-sightedness
in addressing domestic public health concerns to the detriment
of international health may negatively impact the health of the
same domestic populations as the virus (in its original or
mutated form) spreads globally.
The 2004–2005 SARS epidemic, which motivated
fundamental reforms to the IHRs,132 provides another example.
Though aware of the existence of an unknown and potentially
deadly infectious agent spreading among local populations,
Chinese authorities initially attempted to withhold surveillance
data and isolates from WHO and other global partners.133 The
most favorable interpretation of these failures is that SARS
was viewed by Chinese authorities as a localized problem that
posed no threat to others. The more likely view is that China
131. ALBERT CAMUS, THE PLAGUE 308 (Stuart Gilbert trans., 1st Vintage
Intl. ed. 1991) (1948).
132. See Fidler & Gostin, supra note 52, at 85 (“The outbreak of [SARS] in
2003 accelerated the IHR revision process.”).
133. See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Ethical and Legal Challenges Posed by
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: Implications for the Control of Severe
Infectious Disease Threats, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3229, 3233 (2003); accord
Fidler & Gostin, supra note 52, at 88 (citing DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES (1999)) (“States parties often violated the old
IHR by failing to report cases of diseases subject to the Regulations because
they feared other countries would implement economically damaging trade or
travel restrictions.”) .
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intentionally withheld data to avoid the stigma that eventually
followed, leading to billions of dollars of damages and lost
revenues as nations and citizens responded by avoiding
Chinese goods and travel.134 In the end, both China and the
global health community suffered from this initial, unethical
decision as SARS spread across China and to multiple other
countries causing needless morbidity and mortality.135
The strategic legal goal of pandemic flu response efforts
cannot be grounded solely in protectionism, but rather must
adequately prioritize the health of all populations. This is
particularly relevant in decisions to allocate scarce resources.
WHO, member countries, and numerous public- and privatesector entities have issued guidelines on allocating scarce
resources in emergencies that are grounded in principles of
justice and fairness.136 Ethical models for emergency-resource
distributions have been widely proposed.137 To be purposeful,
these allocation models must be supported by legal principles
in real-time emergencies.138 For example, even as the United
States experienced a shortage of available vaccines and
antivirals in the midst of the H1N1 pandemic and despite some
oppostion, President Obama pledged donations of existing U.S.
supplies in mid-September 2009 to global response efforts

134. See Erik Eckholm, SARS in Beijing: The Unraveling of a Cover-Up, in
SARS IN CHINA: PRELUDE TO PANDEMIC? 122–32 (Arthur Kleinman & James
L. Watson eds. 2006).
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS
AND RESPONSE (2009); FED. OFFICE OF PUB. HEALTH, SWISS CONFEDERATION,
SWISS
INFLUENZA
PANDEMIC
PLAN
(2009),
available
at
http://www.bag.admin.ch/influenza/01120/01134/03058/index.html?lang=en;
MASS MEDICAL CARE WITH SCARCE RESOURCES: A COMMUNITY PLANNING
GUIDE, supra note 35; see also Richard Coker & Sandra Mounier-Jack,
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness in the Asia-Pacific Region, 368 LANCET 886,
886–89 (2006) (assessing the plans of eight Asia-Pacific countries).
137. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Medical Countermeasures for Pandemic
Influenza: Ethics and the Law, 295 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 554, 555–56 (2006);
John L. Hick et al., Clinical Review: Allocating Ventilators During Large-scale
Disasters–Problems, Planning, and Process, 11 CRITICAL CARE 217, 218–24
(2007).
138. See JOHNS HOPKINS CTR. FOR PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ETHICS TO GUIDE ALLOCATION DECISIONS INVOLVING
SCARCE RESOURCES DURING PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES (2006), available
at
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/ResourcesPDFs/Summit%20Allocat
ion%20Principles.pdf.
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coordinated by WHO.139 Additional countries including
Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand,
Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom similarly
donated vaccines.140 Though laudable, the objective was not
just to share vaccines to stymie the spread and impact of the
disease elsewhere, but also to limit the impact domestically by
controlling the threat internationally. Only through these types
of legal decisions, grounded in affirmative foreign relations and
theories of global justice, will it be possible to circumvent the
most serious effects of global public health threats like H1N1 in
the future.
IV. CONCLUSION
Facing a novel, albeit relatively mild viral threat in H1N1,
countries responded in disparate ways, buttressed by
incongruent emergency laws and decisions as to when, how, or
if to use them. Whether in ignorance or outright refusal,
countries’ legal and public health responses did not always
conform to WHO’s guidance through its invocation of the IHRs.
Proven public health interventions were negated. Human
rights abuses arose. Economic impacts were realized. And
H1N1 influenza spread like wildfire. This first major test of the
global health system in the face of a global health threat does
not bode well for future outbreaks.
Threats like H1N1 or other highly communicable diseases
cannot be completely snuffed out through existing, or likely
future, global health initiatives. We still cannot prevent
pandemics that arise naturally as part of organized society.
However, when disease spreads because of failures in global
health strategies inhibited by legal principles of national
sovereignty and limited views of the roles of government to

139. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Shortage of Vaccine Poses Political Test for
Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2009 at A4; Press Release, The White House,
President Announces Plan to Expand Fight Against Global H1N1 Pandemic
(Sept.
17,
2009),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/President-Announces-Plan-toExpand-Fight-Against-Global-H1N1-Pandemic/ (promising 10% of U.S.
vaccine supply to global distribution efforts).
140. See, e.g., Meagan Fitzpatrick, Canada to Donate H1N1 Vaccine to the
WHO, CANWEST NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 28, 2010, available at
http://www.canada.com/business/Canada+donate+H1N1+vaccine/2494564/stor
y.html.
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protect only domestic populations, society can no longer blame
a virus completely for its human and economic losses. Not all
governments must respond alike to pandemic threats. To the
contrary, public health threats impact populations differently
depending on multiple factors. Rather, when they respond
legally, they must be mindful of the global health impacts of
their decisions. Tepid acceptance of international disease
control standards like the IHRs are insufficient. Countries
must not only embrace global health goals in response to
pandemic threats but also act consistent with them. The dual
global health legal challenges of this century are (1) to reform
public health laws at every level of government to better reflect
shared, global objectives, and (2) then be prepared to apply
them through the practice of global legal triage.

